

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KINSHASA 1873

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PORG, CG

SUBJECT: MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS: ZAIRE'S POLICY AND POLICY-MAKING

REF: STATE 37591

1. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH ZAIRE HAS A DEFINITE ATTRACTION TO THE RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY OF THIRD WORLD POSITIONS ON MULTI-LATERAL ISSUES, IT SEEKS EQUALLY, IF NOT PRIMARILY, TO SOLVE PRAGMATICAL-
LY ITS OWN SPECIFIC CONCERNS WITHIN THE MULTI-LATERAL FRAMEWORK.
AS LONG AS U.S. INITIATIVES CAN APPEAL TO ZAIRE'S NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS AS A THIRD WORLD LEADER, THE U.S. WILL LIKELY RECEIVE A RECEPTIVE HEARING. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE REPLIES TO REFTTEL'S QUERIES ON THE GOZ'S ATTITUDES AND MECHANICS OF PARTICIPATION IN MULTI-LATERAL FORA. FOR SOME TIME THE GOZ HAS FOUND INTERNATIONAL FORA TO BE USEFUL IN BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXTS. MOBUTU HAS HAD A STRONG DESIRE TO PLAY THE ROLE OF A THIRD WORLD LEADER AND, ESPECIALLY DURING THE OCTOBER 1973 - NOVEMBER 1975 PERIOD, TOOK FREQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE AND RENEW HIS CREDENTIALS AS A NON-ALIGNED LEADER. DURING THE SAME TIME, ZAIRE'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE WAS PRESENTED ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRONT AS AN IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE MOBUTU PRESIDENCY.
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ZAIRE'S RECENT POLITICAL CONCERN IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HAS BEEN ANGOLA; IN THE FUTURE ZAIRE WILL LIKELY SHIFT

TO A BROADER POLITICAL FOCUS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS ARE FAIRLY COMPREHENSIVE AND HAVE BEEN BUILDING STEADILY FOR SEVERAL YEARS.

3. ZAIRE'S WORSENING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES HAVE CAUSED IT TO SEEK BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE AND TO TAKE A HARD LOOK AT ISSUES RELATED TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCER-CONSUMER RELATIONS. MINERALS EXPORTS (PRIMARILY COPPER) ACCOUNT FOR TWO-THIRDS OF THE COUNTRY'S EXPORT EARNINGS AND THUS ECONOMIC EXIGENCIES HAVE CAUSED ZAIRE TO FAVOR STABILITY OF EXPORT EARNINGS AT AS HIGH A LEVEL AS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH THE GOZ IS CATHOLIC IN ITS APPROACH TO THIS GOAL. THE GOZ ORIGINALLY PLACED ITS HOPES ON CIPEC, BUT AFTER THE VISIT OF FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING TO ZAIRE IN THE SUMMER OF 1975 SWITCHED TO SUPPORT FOR A PRODUCER/CONSUMER MEETING ON COPPER. ZAIRE WAS AMONG THE ORIGINAL COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE PREPCON AND HAS CONTINUED TO FOLLOW CLOSELY THE DISCUSSIONS CULMINATING IN CIEC. WE EXPECT INTEREST IN CIEC TO REMAIN, AS WELL AS CONCERN FOR ISSUES RAISED IN THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF UNGA WHICH WAS FOLLOWED CLOSELY HERE. AT THE TIME OF THE SPECIAL SESSION ZAIRE SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE THEN FONMIN STRESSED THE NEED OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES. THE GOZ STILL ADHERES TO THIS VIEW. ZAIRE IS ATTRACTED TO THIRD WORLD POSITIONS ON MANY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, BUT NOT TO THE EXCLUSION OF PRAGMATIC SELF-SALVATION. IF ZAIRE PERCEIVES BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS THAN MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION, IT WILL CHOOSE THE FORMER. THUS, DESPITE AN ATTRACTION TO THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, ZAIRE IS SKEPTICAL OF ANY BENEFITS TO BE RECEIVED THEREFROM IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE (THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENCY RECENTLY CHARACTERIZED THE CIEC DISCUSSION AS BEING AS INCONCLUSIVE AND LONG-WINDED AS THE SALT TALKS) AND IS MOST INTERESTED IN ANY SUPPLEMENTARY WAY TO RESOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS.

4. ZAIRE'S PRIMARY INTERESTS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT IN THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT WILL LIKELY BE THE FORTHCOMING CHANGES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. ZAIRE WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR DECOLONIZATION IN ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH NOT
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PROBABLE, THAT RENEWED TENSIONS BETWEEN ZAIRE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA MIGHT CAUSE THE GOZ TO SEEK MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON THE PRA. ON LOS ISSUES, ZAIRE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR SOME FORM OF COASTAL STATE CONTROL OVER EXPLOITATION OF DEEP SEABED. ON KOREA, IT WILL CONTINUE ITS POSITION OF NEUTRALITY. IT WILL ALSO MAINTAIN ITS OPPOSITION TO EXCLUSION OF MEMBER STATES FROM UN BUT WILL SUPPORT CALL FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. AT THE MOMENT THERE ARE NO KNOWN ZAIRIAN CANDIDATES FOR POSITION IN MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS OR BODIES.

5. ZAIRE SEEKS TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP AND THUS TO INFLUENCE OTHER THIRD WORLD, PARTICULARLY AFRICAN COUNTRIES. THIS POLICY IS MOST NOTICEABLE WHEN MOBUTU HAS DEVELOPED PERSONAL INTEREST IN A PARTICULAR ISSUE. THUS, GOZ EXERTED MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO SECURE SUPPORT AMONG AFRICAN COUNTRIES FOR NON-RECOGNITION OF MPLA WHICH RESULTED IN OAU SUMMIT STALEMATE DURING JANUARY 1976. DURING THE SUMMER OF 1975 MOBUTU ALSO OPPOSED THE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE EXCLUSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE UN. MOBUTU'S POSITION PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE ATTITUDES ADOPTED BY OTHER AFRICAN STATES ON THIS QUESTION, AS IT HAD TWO YEARS EARLIER WHEN HE WAS A LEADER AMONG AFRICAN STATESMEN IN BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. MOBUTU'S 1975 STANCE IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL, INCIDENTALLY, WAS FOLLOWED BY A REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR A QUID PRO QUO FROM U.S. ON ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE. OUTSIDE THESE HIGH-PROFILE CASES, AND ESPECIALLY OUTSIDE THE OAU, GOZ DELEGATIONS DO NOT EXERT INFLUENCE IN AND OF THEMSELVES; THEY TEND TO REMAIN IN BACKGROUND, FOLLOWING GENERAL THIRD WORLD IDEOLOGICAL AND RHETORICAL DIRECTION. ZAIRE IS A MEMBER OF THE UN, MOST OF THE UN'S SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, OAU, ECA, CIPEC, AND OCAM AND GENERALLY FOLLOWS GROUP OF 77, NON-ALIGNED AND AFRICAN GROUP ACTIONS IN THESE FORA UNLESS THE COUNTRY'S OWN SELF-INTEREST OR A PRESIDENTIAL CONCERN INTERVENE.

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ACTION IO-11

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

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6. EMBASSY HAS IMPRESSION THAT GOZ DELEGATIONS ARE CAREFULLY IN-

STRUCTURED ON QUESTIONS OF PRIMARY CONCERN, OR WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBJECT OF INTENSE LOBBYING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (E.G. KOREA). ZAIRIAN DELEGATIONS MAY FREQUENTLY RECEIVE GENERALIZED INSTRUCTIONS TO CONFORM WITH POSITIONS OF MAJORITY (NON-ALIGNED, AFRICAN, ETC...) ON ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST. GOZ CAN AND DOES RETAIN CONTROL OVER ITS DELEGATIONS, IN SOME CASES, BY INSTRUCTING HEADS OF DELEGATIONS TO SPECIFIC CONFERENCES TO CALL IN ON A DAILY BASIS. USUALLY, HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT RECEIVE DAILY REPORTS AND IS OFTEN AT A DISADVANTAGE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH AN APPROACH CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS IN A PARTICULAR MULTILATERAL MEETING. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS LIABLE TO PHONE ITS DELEGATION FOR A FULL REPORT. DELEGATIONS ARE FREQUENTLY PICKED AT LAST MOMENT AND SEEM NOT TO INDULGE IN MEETINGS TO PREPARE POSITIONS BEFORE DEPARTING ZAIRE. DELEGATES, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, HAVE USUALLY HAD OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE SUBJECT MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED, RATHER THAN ACADEMIC OR IDEOLOGICAL EXPERTISE. DURING VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON, ZAIRE'S NO. 2 MAN, DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENCY BISENGIMANA, NOTED THE POOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ZAIRE AND ITS DELEGATIONS, SAYING THAT THE DELEGATIONS COULD RARELY SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY OR EXPERTISE AS ALL THOSE IN THE KNOW WERE REQUIRED AT HOME TO RUN THE COUNTRY. BISENGIMANA ADDED THAT THE LONG DELAYS FOR FORMULATION AND RELAY OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DELEGATES SEVERELY CRIMPED THE CONFIDENTIAL
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WORKINGS OF ZAIRIAN DELEGATIONS. EMBASSY HAS NOTED THAT WHEN WISHING TO MAKE A PARTICULAR POINT GOZ DESPATCHES A RELATIVELY HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL ARMED WITH SPEECH APPROVED BY MOBUTU TO PARTICIPATE IN CONFERENCE DELIBERATIONS. DECISIONMAKING ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES GENERALLY OCCURS AT THE REPUBLIC'S HIGHEST LEVELS.

7. IN GENERAL, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES FOR HEADS OF DELEGATION DO NOT HAVE ANY INDEPENDENT POLITICAL POWER BASE.

8. THE GOZ HAS A MIXED RECORD ON ITS RESPONSES TO USG REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING MULTILATERAL ISSUES. WITHIN THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES U.S. REPRESENTATIVES ARE FREQUENTLY GIVEN COURTEOUS HEARINGS, BUT RESPONSES AT THAT LEVEL ARE GENERALLY NON-COMMUNICATIVE. THERE IS A CONTINUING PROBLEM OF FINDING OFFICIALS WILLING TO DISCUSS MULTI-LATERAL ISSUES AT MIDDLE LEVELS. ON SUBJECTS WHERE USG VITAL INTEREST IS INVOLVED, THE AMB AND DCM RAISE THE ISSUE EITHER WITH THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF OR, MORE FREQUENTLY, WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENCY. CONTACT ON THIS LEVEL USUALLY ELICITS POSITIVE RESPONSES IF ISSUE IS AT ALL WITHIN ZAIRE'S POLICY PARAMETERS. THE GOZ IS WILLING TO DISCUSS MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN BILATERAL SITUATIONS AND HAS BEEN KNOWN TO ABRIDGE BILATERAL RELATIONS IN RESPONSE TO UNFRIENDLY ACTS WITHIN MULTILATERAL CONTEXT... (CF. RECENT SPAT BETWEEN ZAIRE AND GUINEA OVER ANGOLA RESULTING IN WITHDRAWAL OF DIPLOMATIC MISSION) GOZ HAS SOUGHT U.S. SUPPORT FOR VARIOUS MULTILATERAL ISSUES IT

FELT IMPORTANT, ON ITS GENERAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND FOR ITS CANDIDATES IN THE UN. DURING 1975, ZAIRIAN ISSUES INCLUDED REQUEST FOR U.S. SUPPORT IN THE EVENT THE ANGOLAN SITUATION WERE BROUGHT TO DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

9. ONE OF THE MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS IN ZAIRE IS ITS ROLE AS LEADER AND MODERATING INFLUENCE IN VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE IDEOLOGICAL CONCERNS OF THE VAST AMALGAM REFERRED TO AS THE THIRD WORLD HOLDS A STRONG INTEREST FOR ZAIRE, THE COUNTRY'S GOVERNMENT HAS GENERALLY PROVEN PRAGMATIC AND INTERESTED IN ITS OWN PROBLEMS. THE U.S. CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPENING IF THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND ZAIRE ARE EVEN ROUGHLY CONGRUENT. SUCH TACTICS, HOWEVER, MUST AT THE VERY LEAST SHOW A RESPONSIVENESS TO ZAIRE'S OWN CONCERNS AND
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